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ESSAY
Relinquishing and governing the volatile: the many Afghanistans and
critical research agendas of NATO’s governance
Bojan Savić*
Research Fellow, School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia Tech, National Capital
Region, Alexandria, VA 22314, USA
This article invites academics and policy analysts to examine the mechanisms and legacy
of NATO’s security and development governance of Afghan social spaces by using critical
theory concepts. It argues that such scholarly endeavors are growing in importance as the
United States and NATO gradually pull their troops out of Afghanistan. Thus, the article
suggests a broad twofold research agenda. First, it points out that researching social spaces
such as towns, villages, marketplaces, and neighborhoods beyond the realm of intergo-
vernmental politics can lead to thick descriptions of how such places have been governed
from within by agents external to them. Second, the study argues for a multifaceted
examination of instruments, strategies, and institutions of security governance, its conduct
and social effects by deploying critical and Foucauldian concepts such as the rationality
and apparatuses of power relations. Thereby, it proposes an inquiry into Provincial
Reconstruction Teams and Afghan National Security Forces as spatially and temporally
specific apparatuses of surveillance and security.
Keywords: NATO; security and development governance; critical theory; Provincial
Reconstruction Teams; Herat
Nearly two years into the gradual drawdown of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan,
most current debates on the subject remain roughly bifocal. To the extent that they are
ostensibly about Afghanistan itself rather than US politics, their two tightly related foci
are the level and quality of a future ‘Western’ military, economic, and financial ‘commit-
ment’ to Afghanistan (Obama 2009), as well as the perils of a Taliban insurgency
untethered by over 100,000 US, NATO, and non-NATO troops (Jones 2013). As nation
building is dismissed as futile, expensive, or even counterproductive (Katzman 2013;
Cordesman 2012a), it has become tempting to ‘pack up and leave’ as US House
Representative Mike Pompeo described the withdrawal. However, critical scholarship
needs to continuously scrutinize the United States’ and NATO’s interweaving of security
and development practices in Afghanistan. This article is an attempt to outline directions
of possible research agendas with such critical outlooks. In spite of NATO’s gradual
withdrawal, this endeavor is crucial if the legacy of external governance of the country is
to be exposed as more than a binary between ‘honest’ and ‘imperialist’ efforts that have
failed due to the ‘tribal’, ‘corrupt’, or ‘volatile’ nature of Afghanistan.1
It is argued here that such practices are best understood if the level of analysis is
shifted to the ‘local’. Thereby, sweeping generalizations about Afghanistan can be dis-


























airfields, and villages where quotidian circulations of life, trade, agriculture, death,
architecture, or events of political resistance can be zeroed in on, experienced, and
interpreted in more depth. Thicker descriptions of social spaces thus facilitate academic
and policy debates that go past the government’s offices in Kabul and provincial capitals,
and go beyond the few notable civilian, military, paramilitary, tribal, or religious figures
that have become the conventional sociology of the many Afghan wars since the late
1970s. Describing and understanding social spaces as ‘eventful’ (Barthes 1987; Lefebvre
1969) venues disassembles the narratives of one Afghanistan or of many tribal and
volatile Afghanistans as ungovernable, medicalized, and sick (Gregory 2012).
In that sense, provinces and cities such as Herat, and towns such as Shindand, lend
themselves to a study of effects of external governance for a methodologically salient
reason. The communities of the Herat Province, as a whole, have been exposed to a
relatively lower degree of violence (compared to provinces such as Kandahar, Helmand,
or Uruzgan) involving the coalition forces, the Taliban, and the regional warlords. This has
enabled the local Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to devise a more ambitious
development agenda. On the other hand, repeated acts of violence across the Province
and the presence of high-value military assets make Herat and Shindand peculiar cases of
development work. International development practices are thus embedded in an environ-
ment where conflict is simmering and roadside bombs, suicide attacks, and frequent – even
though scattered – clashes between the coalition forces and the insurgency are regularly
reported.2 An interagency study conducted by the Department of State, Department of
Defense, and USAID describes such environments as those ‘where instability precludes
heavy NGO involvement, but where violence is not so acute that combat operations
predominate’ (Morris et al. 2006, 23). Thus, this contingency of insecurity brings out a
full spectrum of governance apparatuses from heavily armed military units to development
experts and agencies. This broad display of governance instruments and strategies thus
allows for a more comprehensive account of how social spaces of transnational contention
are governed. Provinces such as Herat or Kunduz are particularly telling of the potentials
and strategies of NATO’s contemporary governance as they are deemed stabilized by the
Alliance, yet still prone to outbreaks of violence and armed conflict.
This article suggests a critical examination of the conduct and unfolding of NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) ‘politics of persuasion’ in Afghanistan’s
provinces such as Herat. Ranging from school and hospital construction to establishing
agricultural training centers, successive US and Italian-led efforts within ISAF to ‘win the
hearts and minds’ of Herat’s local communities have crisscrossed the Province. According
to the US government, and ISAF’s military and civilian officials in Herat and Shindand,
such measures are directed at dissuading the locals from engaging in poppy production or
supporting the Taliban insurgency by offering improved infrastructure and incentives to
pursue alternative sources of income (GAO 2005; Cable 09KABUL159 2009). While such
policies seem to rest on the mechanisms of persuasion, and are said to involve a range of
international and local actors working in cooperative security governance frameworks,
this brief article invites shedding light on their more controversial underpinnings.
A framework of analysis
The argument put forward here is that the setup, tools, strategies, and tactics of the
external governance of Afghanistan are more complex than the policies and politics of
‘hearts and minds’ would suggest. Besides being intertwined with ISAF’s and Operation























drones, conduct of night raids and air strikes – they define how and for whom Afghanistan
is to be secured and developed. Undoubtedly, coercive force affects the exact communities
that are said to be peacefully convinced not to support the Taliban or engage in illicit
economic practices. However, beyond the lives lost is the problematic of how and where
lives are lived. Training and equipping security forces and instilling an understanding of
their tasks and mission, fostering a national economy based upon specified modes of
production are all tools used to invent, homogenize, and shape Afghanistan in the long
run.
In other words, a complex set of institutions and policies implemented in Shindand
and Herat by the international coalition have decisively shaped and constrained the
choices and lives of the local communities before any visible attempt at winning their
hearts and minds is even made. How this setup has operated (and has been operated) can
be viably dissected by focusing on its predominant rationality (Foucault 2009), its specific
apparatuses (Foucault 1977, 194–228), strategies, and technologies (Foucault 2009) used
to sustain pre-conceived types of security and economy. This brief discussion outlines a
research agenda focused on the rationality that underlines PRTs, as well as how the role
and place of PRTs in the external governance of Afghanistan can be critically understood
if they are studied as surveillance and security apparatuses.
The rationality of external governance
First, drawing on the discourse of international and UN-mediated legitimacy (Rynning 2012,
44–52), ISAF has instituted a specific type of rationality – of reasoning, framing, mental
designation, and mapping – in the governance of Afghanistan. Thereby, efficiency in reaching
externally pre-defined types of stability, security, economic growth, and development guides
the United States and NATO’s specific policies and tactics (CALL 2007), oftentimes at the
expense of the very locals that they are said to support. Numerous communities endure night
raids, drone attacks, and cross fire between the coalition forces, warlords, and the Taliban in the
name of operational efficiency and security that is purportedly pursued for them, but is not
designed by them. This is because the type of rationality, the calculus that ISAF is based upon
is largely inward-oriented and ‘private’ to NATO and its allies. Its quest for efficiency is
concerned with appropriate and desired levels of deployment of financial, technological, and
human resources committed to ISAF by the participating nations, with how the political capital
of their governments is put to use, as well as with the interoperability of different agencies that
PRTs encompass (Szanya et al. 2009; Abbaszadeh et al. 2008). This calculus is almost entirely
intra-organizational, as it is calibrated on the basis of what is considered best for troop and aid
contributing nations (Perito 2005), as opposed to the indigenous individuals and communities
that are said to be secured. The rationality of ISAF and PRTs, the mode of reasoning and logic
that frames their tasks and missions and underlies their principles, is one of aggregate and
project, time and space-specific inputs and costs, and projected and actualized outputs and
benefits (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 14–18). However, the way that costs and benefits are
conceived of is reflective of for whom utility is sought. The narrative of utility maximization
(via ISAF) seems to be limited to the international coalition and the cobweb of transnational
actors present in Afghanistan – from private security contractors to large food corporations.
NATO’s framing of economic or security risk, a crucial analytical tool in an environment seen
as unstable, ignores questions such as ‘whose risk?’ or ‘risk for whom?’, tacitly assuming that























civilian government experts, Afghan government assets and officials, often leaving out even
officials of international organizations, development, and aid workers (Perito 2005, 7, 9).
Efficiency in ‘expanding stability’ across Afghanistan or in implementing development
projects has been often criticized as vague and lacking clear criteria and metrics (Cordesman
2011), but that does not rebut that ISAF operates on the basis of such notions – regardless of
how imprecise they may appear. The calculus of efficiency has been translated into a system
of quantitative indicators and targets, a methodology of ‘ISAF’s progress’ (US Department
of Defense 2012), and for all the criticism that can be raised against their elusiveness or
exaggerated optimism, critical theory needs to go beyond the debate on how the system may
be optimized. One of the questions it needs to explore is how ISAF’s ‘success’ and ‘benefits’
are understood and distributed socially. Success according to whom and benefits for whom?
The language of ISAF’s and PRTs’ mission, tasks, and principles reflects a self-enclosed
system that takes into account the attitudes and needs of its target populations very generally,
almost anecdotally. While it is not always clear what efficiency in security, development,
and economic reforms means, it is a common trait of its discourse that it does not include
societal, indigenous perceptions of safety in locales such as Shindand or Herat, or how
ordinary people understand their own well-being. Security definitions, rarely if ever, include
violent deaths of indigenous individuals and communal crime and, when they do, this
variable is not central to the calculus of risk and ISAF’s success, and features only
sporadically and incompletely (US Department of Defense 2012, 31–32). NATO’s under-
standing of security in Afghanistan is narrowed down to a longitudinal and spatial calculus
of the death toll among the coalition troops, and to the rates and counts of insurgency and
terrorist attacks against them. The social cost of the Afghan war is framed as private to
NATO and its allies, and its biopolitical focus is on the dead and injured from troop
contributing nations. If there is a life count that affects the calculus of whether
‘Afghanistan is worth it’, it fails to factor in the lives and deaths of Afghans.
As far as economic reforms go, they rely on the portrayals of Afghanistan as a ‘sub-
subsistence economy’ that suffers from opium and foreign aid dependency, ‘market
fragmentation’, and the absence of an integrated and competitive national economy
(Cordesman 2012b; Buddenberg and Byrd 2005). As rectifying these deficiencies in a
market-driven way is taken for granted and assumed to be economically beneficial – as
well as ethically justifiable – modes of production and trade are introduced and imposed
on a level and scale that attempt to create a ‘national economy’ competitive internally and
internationally. This is done without much regard to the realities of production and trade
practices across villages and towns and many micro-communities that did not always
pursue competitiveness in Kabul or on a ‘national scale’. However, such practices have
been dismissed as ‘inefficient’ and as reinforcing the problems of Afghanistan’s putatively
fragmented sub-subsistence economy. What goes unquestioned is the rationality that
operates from a hierarchical-vertical birds-eye perspective that can conceive of a ‘national
economy’ in the first place as it assumes that there should be one. The notion of market-
oriented efficiency disregards what many studies have shown – that aspects of subsistence
farming (a cornerstone of Afghanistan’s pre-Soviet economy) tend to be understood as
beneficial to the well-being of self-designated communities, and that introducing
commercial farming practices abruptly can have adverse social effects (Mitchell 2002).
Apparatuses of security and surveillance
Second, institutions such as the Herat PRT and the local outposts of Afghan National























surveillance apparatuses which Foucault understood as ‘ensemble(s) of discourses, insti-
tutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’ (Foucault 1977). In
distinguishing security apparatuses from discipline and public law, Foucault suggested
that their differentia specifica is that they ‘respond to a reality in such a way that this
response cancels out the reality to which it responds – nullifies it, or limits, checks, or
regulates it’ (Foucault 2009, 69). He concluded that ‘this regulation within the element of
reality is fundamental in apparatuses of security’ (Foucault 2009, 69). In that sense, PRTs
and ANSF have not simply outlawed terrorism and insurgency mobilizing their resources
to fight them in all-out wars. Those measures alone would not have much effect in
absorbing the destructive power of the Taliban and the numerous warlords across
Afghanistan. Instead, NATO and the government in Kabul recognized the pervasive
presence of armed groups throughout the country, upon which they devised a multifaceted
system embodied in PRTs and ANSF to weaken the insurgency.
First, they established a network of continuous surveillance of roads, marketplaces,
private homes, mosques, schools, government offices, crops, and other venues of social
circulation that could be made available to the insurgency as resources or chosen as targets
of their attacks. In other words, besides ordinary citizens, the surveillance apparatus has
covered individuals and groups of particular interest to NATO and Kabul, and, in addition
to those with a criminal or militant past, it has included religious leaders, tribal elders,
distinguished politicos, and oligarchs. They are typically framed as variably important to
the expansion and preservation of ‘stability’, whereby the narrative of blurred lines
between criminals, deserving individuals, US enemies, public officials, and ‘power
brokers’ is reinforced in US and NATO officials’ statements, and both public and
classified documents (Eide 2012; Felbab-Brown 2013). Thus, the population monitored
through PRTs and ANSF is understood as contingent and its behavior aleatory – oscillat-
ing between a political constraint, a threat, and an opportunity. NATO has deployed PRTs
as acting apparatuses to work within this uncertainty and normalize it through an effective
use of warlords as allies in maintaining security and suppressing poppy production, or by
pitting warlords and/or local Taliban leaders against one another in order to control
general levels of violence. To effectively work within the dynamics of violence, NATO
has used PRTs and ANSF to oversee, monitor, and gather information about the general
populations and governance structures of different villages, towns, and communities, as
well as to gather intelligence about their specific pockets. To give but one example, an
anonymous high-ranking US official at the Herat PRT described his mission from
September 2004 onwards as ‘watch[ing] the new governor’ appointed after the removal
of Ismael Khan from power in March that year (interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy,
22 March 2005). This, as he acknowledged, entailed monitoring the relationship between
the new governor, other provincial government officials, the local military leaders,
warlords, and Khan’s close associates in Shindand and Herat, as well as unofficially
mediating among them in situations of conflict (interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy,
22 March 2005).
Second, PRTs and ANSF are deployed to operate within the dynamics of instability
and uncertainty by recruiting locals into the Afghan National Army and the Police.
Thereby, NATO and the government in Kabul knowingly compete with the Taliban
insurgency and local warlords for manpower in the recruitment process. NATO comman-
ders and provincial governors do not always know the individual criminal or paramilitary
histories of their recruits. However, they do know that a portion of what they have framed























NATO’s goals in the country. Oftentimes, ANSF recruits or employees of private security
companies sub-contracted by US companies include individuals who simultaneously
pledge allegiance to a warlord or are insurgency fighters (McCain 2010). Having seen a
number of iterations of deadly attacks, NATO commanders have learned that there is a
probability that some ANSF recruits might be taking their weapons up against NATO or
the central Afghan government. Even though some ANSF training programs were tem-
porarily discontinued (US Department of Defense 2012, 37), the logic of how PRTs and
ANSF engage with this probability and uncertainty, i.e., how they operate as security
apparatuses, goes beyond such total solutions. The crux of their security functions is to
learn about the profiles and patterns of the insurgent and criminal ‘infiltration’ into the
ANSF (Katzman 2013), as well as to determine the root causes of why Afghan men join
or actively support the Taliban insurgency and criminal gangs. This has, in turn, led to
attempts to design broader counterterrorist and counterinsurgency strategies based on
‘lessons learned’ – and for lessons to be learned, a level of risk and uncertainty needs
to be factored into the calculus. Certainly, the aleatory dynamics of the ANSF recruitment
and training remain perilous for NATO and life threatening for its troops. However, as the
risk is managed and governed through PRTs and the ANSF themselves, it becomes a
calculated part of the broader strategy to weaken the insurgency in the long run. Thus,
surveillance, intelligence gathering, and the more narrow functions of physical security
provision and training become intertwined in a blend of applied counterinsurgency
strategies and techniques that draw upon the knowledge generated about the eligible
population of recruits.
Finally, scrutinizing the process of social legitimation of apparatuses such as PRTs is
the key to understanding their continued operation. PRTs, one of the crucial structures in
the external governance of Afghanistan, and the Afghan security forces that they train,
were instituted after the fall of the Taliban government without a prior social consensus –
formal or informal. Currently, important tools of PRTs’ post-factum legitimation are
financial incentives given to ANSF recruits and their families in the form of competitive
wages. They are intended to convince them that the presence of the international coalition
in the country is beneficial to their well-being and household economies, while also being
an insurance policy against the locals’ involvement with the insurgency, poppy produc-
tion, or drug trafficking. Scholars, pundits, and journalists all too often replicate the
discourse heard among the NATO member states’ politicos on how individuals and
communities financed by the United States and NATO end up turning against them
(Felbab-Brown 2013, 218–219). That is why research anchored in critical (development)
theory or anthropology has the potential to address the questions less heard. How is the
well-being of ANSF recruits and their families affected by foreign funds funneled through
ISAF without viable economic and financial alternatives in the long run? What social
pressures and security risks do the recruits themselves and their families experience?
Conclusion
In governing local security in Herat and Shindand, ISAF and NATO have veiled coercive
practices such as night raids and drone attacks by using financial incentives to build
networks of opposition to the Taliban and disobedient warlords. Thereby, it is not the
locals who have been being secured and protected – they have been framed as a
population, a resource used to support NATO’s counterinsurgency goals. The object of
protection has been the Herat PRT itself and other NATO-supported institutions, as well as























In inviting a study that would unveil and scrutinize the controversies, contradictions,
and social tensions of NATO’s security and development practices, of its technology of
external governance of Afghanistan, this article has suggested a broad twofold research
agenda. First, it has been suggested that researching social spaces such as towns, villages,
marketplaces, and neighborhoods beyond the realm of intergovernmental politics can lead
to thick descriptions of how such places have been governed from within by agents
thought of as external, yet increasingly merging with them. Second, the article has argued
for a multifaceted study of instruments, strategies, and institutions of security governance,
its conduct and social effects by deploying critical and Foucauldian concepts such as the
rationality and apparatuses of power relations.
Notes
1. For an extensive example of this discourse, see Foreign Policy’s discussion What Went Wrong
in Afghanistan from 4 March 2013 at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/
what_went_wrong?page=0,0.
2. For instance, George C. Marshall’s Marcus Gauster (2008) ranked Herat as ‘not calm and not
stable’, or coefficient 5, on his 1–10 instability scale of Afghan provinces.
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